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ABSTRACT 
 
What kind of institutions is most essential to be trustworthy in order for a society to function well? 
To the extent that previous research has addressed the problem, trust in electoral, judicial, public 
administration and economic institutions have been most frequently mentioned as most important. 
The problem, however, is worth a more thorough research approach, where trust in different kind 
of institutions is systematically compared across political systems. The study is based on five differ-
ent data sources, three aggregated datasets (CSES, WVS and ESS) and two surveys of Swedish citi-
zens (SOM and the Lore Citizen Panel). When it comes to regime support (and legitimacy) institu-
tional trust matters; especially trust in electoral and judicial institutions. Quality of government 
matters also. Economic factors, however, matter less in this instance. Political factors rule, not eco-
nomical. Nations succeed when there is trust in electoral and judicial institutions and when there 
are impartial public administrations. 
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Trust builds societies. Without trust we would not put money in banks, eat at restaurants or leave 
our children at school. Lacking trust most cities would have surrounding walls like in ancient times 
and many of us would be carrying arms as in bad old days. Without trust human exchange does not 
happen easily and civil society runs the risk of breaking down. Trust does not only minimize vio-
lence (Schneier 2012). It makes all endeavors more efficient, saves time, and makes everything less 
expensive. The operating ingredient is that trust lowers transaction costs. In societies with high 
levels of interpersonal social trust and high levels of institutional trust most things run smoother 
and at lower costs (Holmberg and Weibull 2013, Norris 2008a, Newton and Norris  2000, Luhman 
1989, Trägårdh 2009).  
 
In theory and more generally, all this is well and almost self-evident.  But trust it not an either or 
commodity. With zero trust most things do not work, but what about with some trust or medium 
trust? In theory as well as operationally, trust must be conceived of as a graded phenomenon, not as 
a dichotomy. Furthermore, what kind of trust are we talking about? Social trust between people? 
(Putnam 1993, 2001) Or people´s trust in a society´s different institutions? (Lipset and Schneider 
1983). And if the later, what kind of institutions is most essential to be trustworthy in order for a 
society to function well? Electoral institutions? Judicial institutions? Civil Society institutions? Eco-
nomic institutions? Religious institutions? Communicative institutions? Public Administration insti-
tutions? Or some other kind of institution?  
 
To the extent that previous research has addressed the problem, trust in electoral, judicial, public 
administration and economic institutions have been most frequently mentioned as most important 
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Rothstein 1998); for older times trust 
in religious institutions as well (Moberg 2011). If any institutions have to be especially mentioned, 
the best candidates would probably be located within the electoral or judicial systems (Rothstein 
and Stolle 2008). Trust in the rule of law is often singled out as the cornerstone in any legitimate 
and rightful commonwealth (Uslaner 2008) and trust in the electoral input side of democracy is 
usually seen as an indispensable part of a well-functioning democratic regime. The problem, how-
ever, is worth a more thorough research approach, where trust in different kind of institutions - and 
their impact on how well societies are governed - is systematically compared across political sys-
tems. That is the quest we have set up to pursue in this article.  
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Theoretical Vantage Point 
 
Our theoretical problem is regime support and the extent to which, and through which mecha-
nisms, popular support is related to peoples´ trust in different societal institutions. The hypothesis 
is that trust matters. And that trust theoretically and out there in the real world is something differ-
ent and separate from support or positive evaluations.  
 
Trust lowers transaction costs and enhances compliance behavior. What should be done gets done 
less costly, more efficiently and quicker. And that is more appreciated among people than the op-
posite, that what is done is done more costly, less efficiently and more slowly. Consequently, trust 
in important societal institutions is essential for building and preserving support for political re-
gimes. By regime support we mean the degree to which citizens positively evaluate governance 
outcomes; not only assessments of policies or policy outputs, but judgments of functionalities on 
the ground.  
 
In this context we will restrict the analysis to democratic regimes. Thus, our concrete focus be-
comes how citizens in democracies evaluate how their democratic system works and the extent to 
which these evaluations are associated with trust in different societal institutions. Observe that we 
are interested in how people assess how their democratic polity functions (works). Whether or not 
citizens are in favor of a democratic system as such is not our research object. 
 
When it comes to institutional trust and the relationship to regime support and legitimacy, previous 
research has paid most attention to trust in two specific kinds of institutions – electoral and judicial 
institutions (Rothstein 1998, 2013, Kumlin 2004, Gilley 2009, Ostrom 2005, Rose-Ackerman 2004, 
Tyler 2003, Uslaner 2002). We will do the same. But while focusing on electoral and judicial institu-
tions, we will not ignore other societal institutions of possible relevance. The impact of trust in 
electoral and judicial institutions on democratic regime support will be put in perspective by also 
studying the effect of trust in other societal institutions. Our theoretical expectation is that trust in 
especially electoral institutions, but also in judicial institutions, are stronger related to evaluations of 
how democratic regimes functions, than are trust in other types of societal institutions; whether 
they are economic institutions, religious institutions, civil society institutions, bureaucratic institu-
tions or media institutions.  
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The reason for this hypothesis is twofold. First, electoral institutions for sure, but as well judicial 
institutions are constitutive elements in a democratic system. If they fail to function there is no 
democracy. Unfree and unfair elections, and police and judges that do not uphold the law and con-
trol corruption are recipes for a dysfunctional democratic system. Rule of elections and rule of law 
are at the foundation of any functioning democracy.  
 
Second, trust research has showed that institutional trust on the individual level builds on and is 
sustained by a number of factors, among which peoples´ perceptions of how an institution fulfills 
its main task is the most essential (Holmberg and Weibull 2013, Mayer 1995, Stahl and Sitkin 2004, 
Luhman 1989, Misztal 1996). Trust is mostly a consequence of the degree to which citizens feel 
that an institution performs what it is supposed to perform. Job performance is the key. Bad per-
formance causes trust to go down, good performance causes trust to go up.        
 
A Simplified and Operationalized Model     
 
Ideally and in an empirical fashion, we would like to be able to study good government and the 
extent to which good government is dependent on - or at least related to - trust in different forms 
of societal institutions. However, in order to achieve something close to that we have to make sim-
plifications, theoretically as well as operationally. Our study object – our dependent variable – 
ought ideally to be some kind of “objective” measure of how well different political systems per-
form. In practice, in our case, we have settled for a rather rough proxy variable based on how citi-
zens subjectively assess the performance of their polity.  In a way we let people be the judge of 
whether their political system is run well or not. We have chosen the much discussed and often 
criticized SWoD-variable as our operational dependent variable (Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson 
1995, Lagos 2003, Linde and Ekman 2003, Esaiasson and Ottervik 2014).1 The acronym stands for 
Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy. As a subjective measure of “job performance” it has 
been extensively applied across many countries around the world. And that is a big advantage, since 
it increases the number of cases in our empirical tests.  A potential drawback is that the SWoD-
index is multidimensional, measuring short term factors, mainly economic circumstances and gov-
                                                     
1
 In order to emphasize that we are talking about Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy, not Satisfaction with Democracy, 
we use the acronym SWoD instead of the perhaps sometimes misleading SWD. 
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ernment performances, as well as more long term factors related to the status of civil rights and the 
extent of free and fair elections. This drawback does not necessarily constitute a problem in our 
case, however. We want a broad measure of job performance encompassing short term economic 
and government assessments as well as more systemic judgments of regime procedures and out-
comes.  A more evident drawback is that the SWoD-measure is only applicable for democratic 
political systems. Consequently, our study is restricted to democratic nations, excluding authoritari-
an and non-democratic countries like China, Vietnam, Cuba and Zimbabwe (Charron and Lapuente 
2012). 
 
An advantage of SWoD that surprised us because we did not know it when we started our study is 
that among our chosen thirty four test countries, the aggregated SWoD measure correlates very 
highly with another “Good Government” measure – Bruce Gilley´s much used measure of state 
legitimacy. Gilley´s theoretical definition is that “a state is legitimate if it holds and exercises politi-
cal power with legality, justification, and consent” (Gilley 2009: 8). He operationalize legitimacy 
using a complicated system encompassing no less than nine indicators, most of them involving 
attitudinal data taken from comparative surveys and aggregated to the national level (pp 14-15). The 
correlation between Gilley´s elaborate legitimacy measure and the more simple and straightforward 
SWoD measure is .71 in our sample of countries. This means that in operational terms Gilley´s 
measure of legitimacy and the SWoD measure are, if not scientific siblings so at least close cousins 
(see also Gjefsen 2012 as well as Esaiasson and Ottervik 2014). 
 
Consequently, in an empirical sense and with a little stretch, our study could not only be seen as a 
study of the importance of institutional trust for regime support, but as well as a study of the im-
portance of institutional trust for regime legitimacy. However, we will not go down that road any 
further. Studying regime support is good and tough enough without complicating things by widen-
ing the task and include the legitimacy concept as part of our dependent variable.             
 
Our explanatory factor, trust in different kinds of institutions, involve less problematic simplifica-
tions. Trust is an inherently subjective individual trait; it can be aggregated to a group level, but it is 
best measured subjectively on the individual level (Pharr and Putnam 2000).  An accessibility prob-
lem could be that we – in the present context - do not want to study the impact of the widely 
measured inter-personal trust phenomenon (Rothstein 1998, La Porta et al. 1999). Instead we want 
to study the impact of different kinds of institutional trust, and consequently, need measures of 
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trust in various sorts of societal institutions, not only the more standard measures of trust in gov-
ernment or parliament.  Luckily and mainly thanks to the World Value Survey (WVS), there are 
today not a shortage of useful comparative measures of institutional trust, covering a wide variety 
of different institutions (Inglehart 1997).2 
 
WVS measures trust in some sixteen different institutions across a large number of countries. All of 
these sixteen institutions will be part of our analysis but we are especially interested in studying the 
impact of political and legal institutions. The reason being that previous research has claimed that 
the functioning of political-legal institutions is of special importance for regime support. Rule of 
law and the procedural performance and/or output of democratic/political input institutions like 
parliaments and political parties are essential. The WVS studies encompass trust measures of two 
legal institutions (Justice System and Police) and of four political institutions (Political Parties, Par-
liament, Government and United Nations).       
 
Even if our model is simplified - not least in that we specify that institutional trust “causes” SWoD, 
and not the other way around - we need to include a couple of other explanatory variables in our 
test in order not to exaggerate the potential impact of the institutional trust factors on the depend-
ent variable – citizens´ degree of support/positive evaluation of their democratic regime. Two ob-
vious controls are the state of the economy and the quality of government. We know from previous 
research that citizens in richer countries tend to be more appreciative of their regime than people in 
poorer countries (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Furthermore, we also know that citizens in polit-
ical systems with better functioning bureaucracies (=high levels of quality of government, QoG) 
tend to be more content with how their democracy works (Holmberg and Rothstein 2012). A good 
economy as well as an impartial bureaucracy matters and thus need to be statistically controlled 
before we can say anything more definitive about a possible and separate impact of institutional 
trust on people´s evaluation of how their democratic regime functions. GDP/capita and QoG con-
stitute our baseline model on top of which the institutional trust variables have to prove their po-
tential independent effects on democratic regime support. 
 
The model is an aggregate level model intended to be applicable primarily on the national level. 
State functionalism and how it is related to different forms of institutional trust is our research area. 
                                                     
2
 Another useful measurer of comparative institutional trust is the European Social Survey (ESS). We will as well use 
ESS data. However, ESS only covers European countries and includes a limited number of institutions (eight).  
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But some of the model´s implications could as well be tested on the individual level given the avail-
ability of relevant data. As it happens, reasonably suitable micro level data is to be found in our 
native Sweden. Hence, we will test the model on the aggregate as well as on the individual level.3   
 
Data Sources 
 
The by far best data source for our institutional trust variables is the World Value Survey. Begin-
ning in the 1980s and continuing up to date in six consecutive waves, trust in some sixteen different 
institutions has been systematically measured in about seventy countries (Inglehart 1997). The insti-
tutions covered include electoral and judicial ones as well as bureaucratic, civil society, economic, 
religious and media institutions. We will work with the measurements taken in the early 2000s. 
Trust indices will be constructed based on results for more than one institution, and these indices 
will be used in the model tests.  
 
The most theoretically important indices will be the ones involving trust in input oriented demo-
cratic institutions like Parliament and Political Parties and legal institutions like the Justice System 
and the Police.4 Regrettably, no index concerning trust in public administration can be constructed 
since WVS only contains one relevant item – trust in Civil Services. And, to make things worse, 
that item is highly questionable. What does it measure? Civil Service, we are afraid, can mean very 
different things in different national contexts and is as well sensitive to translation nuances.5         
 
Our dependent variable, people´s satisfaction with the working of democracy in their country, is 
not included in the WVS. Instead WVS has chosen to measure a related but quite different concept, 
                                                     
3
 An important criticism made by Kittel (2006) is the lack of robustness that often seem to appear in macro-quantitative 
comparative research in the social sciences. We agree with this criticism but we do not think the solution is to stop 
conducting cross-sectional country comparative research. Instead we argue that theoretical propositions of individual 
behavior should be empirically tested on different levels of aggregation. Hence, our approach is to run our models on 
the aggregated level across countries and then, in a second step, we are zooming in and testing the same models 
among individuals in one of the countries included in our sample. By this approach we are extending the validity and 
generalizability of our findings.  
4
 WVS measures trust in two other political institutions, Government and the United Nations. Neither of them is included 
in our democratic/political trust index since Government is more of an output institution and the UN is not a national 
institution.  
5
 The translation of Civil Services in the Swedish questionnaire is “Civilförvaltningen”, a terminology not used at all in 
Sweden for public administration. The best translation would instead probably be “Offentlig förvaltning”. We have not 
systematically looked at how “Civil Services” has been translated into other languages. However, a newly started project 
at University of Gothenburg is about to do just that, among other things. See Dahlberg and Holmberg (2015) Language 
Effects in Surveys (LES).   
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namely how citizens evaluate the development of democracy in their country. And since a develop-
ment assessment is something else than an assessment of how well something works – an evalua-
tion of direction versus an evaluation of level – we cannot use WVS data for our dependent varia-
ble. But since our main empirical test is to be done on the aggregate national level, we are not nec-
essarily stuck with WVS data. We can look elsewhere to find information on how citizens evaluate 
the working of their democracy, and then aggregate that information to the national level.  A search 
like that led us to CSES – the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. CSES is a cooperative pro-
ject involving national election studies in most electoral democracies (Klingemann 2009). Since the 
mid 1990s CSES has carried out four waves of comparative election studies in some forty democ-
racies. And the SWoD measure has been included as a regular feature in all the surveys. Thus, our 
dependent SWoD variable is taken from early 2000 CSES data.6  
 
The control variables, economic situation and the quality of government, are both taken from the 
Quality of Government data bank (Dahlberg et al. 2011). Economic situation is rather convention-
ally defined as GNP/capita. Quality of Government (QoG) on the other hand is a more novel 
concept and thus less self-evidently measured. We have chosen to apply two related but differently 
operationalized versions of QoG.  One is the Government Effectiveness Index developed by the 
World Bank (Kaufmann 2004, Kaufmann et al. 2010, Magalhaes 2013). The other is an Impartial 
Public Service (IPS) index designed within the Quality of Government Institute (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2012, Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012). The two measures are correlated with each 
other on a high level (r= .87), but they are not identical. By applying both of them separately as well 
as in tandem, we are giving QoG an extra strong controlling position in the model test. However, 
the outcome of these robustness tests does not change any conclusions in this paper. Consequently, 
in the analyses to follow we will only apply the IPS Index from the QoG institute. 
 
Our micro level test will be performed based on data from the SOM Institute at the University of 
Gothenburg. The Institute carries out annual nationwide and regional surveys in Sweden since 1986 
(Weibull, Oscarsson and Bergström 2013). We will use data from the 2010 and 2012 national sur-
veys (Holmberg, Weibull and Oscarsson 2011). They included the SWoD measure, institutional 
trust results for twenty one different institutions and data relevant for our two control variables – 
                                                     
6
The guiding principle for matching CSES data with WVS data has been to use trust items from the wave that most 
closely matches the year for the CSES modules. When data has been missing for the corresponding wave, the interme-
diate WVS wave has been used and thereafter the subsequent WVS wave in relation to the CSES.  
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economic situation and quality of government.7 Data on household income will be used to tap 
peoples´ economic circumstances.  
 
The QoG variable is more difficult to nail down in a reasonable and comparative way. However, in 
the SOM data bank there are extensive measurements of how citizens evaluate the job performance 
of a whole set of public services like health care, tax collection, primary schools, and the Public 
Employment Service. Consequently, we can get measures of how ordinary citizens assess the quali-
ty of government. Admittedly, it is not the same as the World Bank´s or the QoG Institute´s quality 
of government measures. WB and QoG primarily rely on expert judgments, not evaluations done 
by citizens. The SOM measure will in contrast be based on assessments by ordinary people. But 
maybe this difference is not so very important. Comparative studies on perception of corruption 
among experts and elites as well as among common citizens indicate very small differences 
(Holmberg 2009). Upstairs or downstairs, expert or laymen, at least corruption tends to look the 
same across countries. Perhaps that is also true for the broader phenomenon quality of govern-
ment? 
 
It´s Judicial and Electoral Institutions, Stupid   
 
Bill Clinton´s campaign manager James Carville (2009) once answered the question what decided 
elections with: It´s the economy, stupid! Bo Rothstein and others who have pointed to the im-
portance of well-functioning political and especially judicial institutions in building societal trust and 
more specifically in building inter-personal trust, could have exclaimed: It´s judicial and electoral 
institutions, stupid, when asked what kind of institutions are most important in creating and sus-
taining support for the performance of democracy. And they would have been right, at least prelim-
inary and only looking at bivariate relationships. 
 
Among thirty four countries, correlations between trust in sixteen different institutions and the 
aggregated level of citizens´ satisfaction with how their democracy functions are clearly strongest 
for some judicial and electoral institutions like the Police, the Judicial System, Political Parties and 
                                                     
7
 The SOM Institute´s measures of institutional trust include trust in Parliament and Political Parties as well as trust in 
Courts and Police; thus indices for our democratic/political input variables as well as for our legal variables can be 
constructed. However, SOM´s institutional trust measurement does not include any measurement of trust in Public 
Administration (or Civil Services). Consequently, we cannot on the individual level test the impact of trust in Public 
Administration on Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy.     
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Parliament (see Table 1).8 Trust in Economic, Civil Society, Media and Religious institutions show 
up with weaker or even in some cases with negative relationships with SWoD. As is shown in Table 
1, the four institutions with the strongest trust associations with how citizens evaluate the working 
of their democracy, are first the Political Parties, second Parliament, third the Justice System and 
fourth the Police. Civil Services, whatever that connotes in different national contexts, are ranked 
number eight.  Government – a political institution but more output oriented and more partisan - 
shows up further down the list on rank ten.  
 
Trust in the four top electoral and legal institutions are correlated about the .50 level with the ag-
gregated SWoD measure among our thirty four countries. In other words, there is a pretty substan-
tial bivariate relationship between trust in central input focused electoral institutions and SWoD as 
well as between trust in judicial institutions and peoples´ support for the way their democracy 
works. Comparable associations for trust in other types of institutions tend to be lower. For exam-
ple, the correlation between SWoD and trust in Civil Service and Government are .39 and .37, re-
spectively, while the comparable correlations with trust in Parliament and the Justice System are .52 
and .51. Apparently, what matters most is trust in democratic input institutions and judicial institu-
tions.   
 
  
                                                     
8
 The countries included are: 1. Albania, 2. Australia, 3. Brazil, 4. Bulgaria, 5. Canada, 6. Chile, 7. Czech Republic, 8. 
Finland, 9. France, 10. Germany, 11. Hungary, 12. Italy, 13. Japan, 14. Kyrgyzstan, 15. Lithuania, 16. Mexico, 17. 
Netherlands, 18. New Zealand, 19. Norway, 20. Peru, 21. Poland, 22. Republic of Korea, 23. Romania, 24. Slovenia, 
25. South Africa, 26. Spain, 27. Sweden, 28. Switzerland, 29. Taiwan, 30. Thailand 31. Turkey, 32. United Kingdom, 33. 
Uruguay, 34. USA. We have excluded countries that were classified as “not free” according to the Freedom House 
index at the time when data was collected (see Freedom in the World. Selected data from Freedom House’s annual global 
survey of political rights and civil liberties”. www.freedomhouse.org). 
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TABLE 1, CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SATISFACTION WITH THE WORKING OF DEMOCRACY 
(SWOD) AND TRUST IN SOCIETAL INSTITUTIONS IN THIRTY FOUR COUNTRIES (PEARSON'S R). 
 
 
Institution Correlations (r) 
1. Political Parties .56 
2. Parliament .52 
3. Justice System .51 
4. Police .51 
5. Labour Unions .50 
6. Environmental Movement .44 
7. Women's Movement .42 
8. Civil Services .39 
9. Humanitarian Organizations .39 
10. Government .37 
11. Major Companies .14 
12. Armed Forces .10 
13. United Nations -.14 
14. Press -.17 
15. Churches -.20 
16. Television -.22 
Comment: The data on SWoD comes from National Election Studies in the years 1996-2006 administrated through 
CSES. The trust data are from wave three, four and five of WVS. 
 
To illustrate the relationships more vividly six scatter plots are depicted in Figure 1. All with SWoD 
as the dependent vertical axis and with trust in Police, Parliament, Justice System, Political Parties 
and Armed Forces as well as Press as independent horizontal axes.  Armed Forces and Press are 
included to demonstrate how the results look for two institutions with no relationship between the 
degrees of trust and how citizens evaluate how their democracy works.  
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FIGURE 1, IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST ON CITIZENS' REGIME SUPPORT (SWOD): SIX IL-
LUSTRATIVE SCATTERPLOTS. 
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Comment: The scatterplots are based on data from CSES (for the SWoD-variable, scaled 1-4) and from WVS (for the trust 
variables, scaled 1-4). The higher SWoD and the higher trust scores, the more citizens tend to be satisfied with the working of 
their democracies and have more confidence in the relevant institutions.  
 
The strong positive correlation between SWoD and trust in the Judicial System and in the Political 
Parties is very evident in the scatter plots with countries like Norway, Switzerland and Sweden - 
where people tend to trust parties as well as the rule of law at the same time as they tend to be satis-
fied with the working of their democracies - in the upper right corner and other countries like Bul-
garia, Slovenia and Romania, with citizens less trusting and less satisfied in the lower left corner. 
The case of trust in the Armed Forces - in our sample of thirty four democracies - reveals an almost 
total lack of association between how people assess how their democracy functions and the extent 
to which the Armed Forces are trusted. The scatter plot involving trust in the Press also reveals an 
almost non-existent correlation with SWoD, although in this case the very weak association is actu-
ally negative. The empirical reason for the slight negative relationship is that citizens in countries 
like Australia, United Kingdom and USA tend to be satisfied with how there democracies work at 
the same time as they tend not to trust the Press, while in other countries like in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania people are less satisfied with the working of their democracy despite the fact that they tend 
to trust the Press. Obviously, trust in media – Press as well as Television – is of less importance in 
sustaining positive citizen evaluations of the functioning of democratic regimes than is sometimes 
portrayed in the literature (Färdigh 2013, Norris 2008b, Sussman 2001).   
 
Effects of Institutional Trust Still Remains After Controls    
 
No matter if we model institutional trust as a causal factor behind citizens´ satisfaction with the 
working of their democracy or only talk of attitudinal co-variations, we want to make sure whether 
our empirical bivariate relationships withstand some obvious statistical controls. The relevant and 
minimal controls in our case are to account for the effects of quality of government and economic 
situation - our baseline model. The purpose of the regression analysis in Table 2 is to do just that.  
In our sample of thirty four democracies, SWoD is regressed on two trust indices combining trust 
in two democratic/political input institutions and two judicial institutions, on an index measuring 
  15 
impartiality in public administration, and on GDP per capita. Bivariate as well as multivariate re-
gression coefficients are presented in the table.9  
 
TABLE 2, REGRESSING SATISFACTION WITH THE WORKING OF DEMOCRACY (SWOD) IN THIRTY 
FOUR COUNTRIES ON TRUST IN ELECTORAL AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS, ON IMPARTIAL PUB-
LIC ADMINISTRATION AND ON GDP/CAPITA (OLS REGR. COEFF; STD. ERR. WITHIN PARENTHE-
SES).  
  Bivariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  SWoD SWoD SWoD SWoD SWoD 
Electoral Trust Index 1.71*** (.40) - 1.17*** (.36) - 1.72*** (.57) 
     
 
Judicial Trust Index 1.89*** (.41) - - .85 (.54) -.96  (.79)  
     
 
Impartial Public Admin. .74*** (.12) .87*** (.24) .70*** (.20) .73*** (.23)  .77*** (.23) 
     
 
GDP/cap(ln) .46** (.18) -.16 (.27) -.11 (.21) -.21 (.24) -.03 (.24) 
     
 
Constant - 4.06 (2.60) 2.99 (1.99) 4.08* (2.21) 2.46 (2.29) 
R-squared - .42 .54 .44 .54 
N 34 34 34 34 34 
VIF (Mean): - 2.14 1.87 2.13 3.01 
Comment: p>|t|=.01***; =.05**; =.10*. Standard errors are boot-strapped with 1000 replications. SWoD, the depend-
ent variable, is taken from CSES and scaled 1 (low satisfaction) to 4 (high satisfaction). The independent variables are all 
scaled between 0 (low trust, low impartiality and low GDP per capita) and 1 (high trust, high impartiality and high GDP per 
capita). The Trust Indices, based on WVS data, combines trust in two electoral institutions and two judicial institutions - 
Political Parties and Parliament as well as Police and Justice system (see Table 1). The Impartial Public Administration Index 
builds on a global expert survey run by the Quality of Government Institute (see Holmberg and Rothstein 2012). GDP/capita 
is taken from the World Bank - World Development Indicators (World Bank WDI 2013), provided by Teorell et. al. 
(2013). We have here elaborated with different measures of economy, such as for example GDP-growth/cap, but our results 
remain unaffected.  
 
                                                     
9
 We have also tested to include trust in Civil Services as an independent variable, although we suspect the validity of 
that measure to be doubtful. The bivariate regression outcome in our sample of 34 countries is that the relationship 
between trust in Civil Services and SWoD is significant and has an expected sign – the more trust in Civil Services the 
more Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy. However, the effect is less pronounced than the comparative effects 
of the democratic/political input institutions and the judicial institutions. After controls, the effect of Civil Services not only 
becomes insignificant. It ends up with a wrong sign. Our conclusion is not that trust in Public Administration does not 
play a role when it comes to how satisfied citizens are with how well their democracy works. Instead, our conclusion is 
that the jury is still undecided. The WVS measurement of trust in Public Administration (Civil Services) is not good 
enough to render a more conclusive verdict.      
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A first observation is that the two trust indices as well as the impartiality index all show strong biva-
riate relationships with how people evaluate the working of their democracy. The economic varia-
ble, GDP per capita, also has an expected impact on SWoD, but to a weaker extent. The first 
rounds of multivariate tests demonstrate the same basic result. Institutional trust separately via 
democratic input institutions as well as separately via judicial institutions, and impartial public ser-
vice all have independent and strongly significant effects on citizens´ assessment of how their de-
mocracy works, while the effect of economic circumstances is clearly weaker and non-significant.10 
However, when we test the impact of the two trust indices together in multiple regressions, Judicial 
trust  fail to reach an independent significant effect level although the effect signs in both of the 
separate cases (model 2 and 3) are the correct and expected ones; the higher trust in democratic 
input institutions and in judicial institutions the better SWoD. But the limited number of cases and 
the high correlation between our two trust indices (r=.75) mean that we run into a serious multicol-
linearity problem preventing us from being able to really test the separate effect of the Judicial  trust 
factor.11 Trust in legal institutions has an impact on how people judge how well their democracies 
function. How strong that impact is taken separately and under control for trust in other relevant 
institutions we do not know and cannot tell given the limited number of countries at our disposal.12 
  
                                                     
10
 As mentioned earlier, our analyses on the aggregated level are based on data from two different data sources. Our 
dependent variable (SWoD) is taken from Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES) module 1,2 and 3; while 
the independent variables on Electoral and Judicial Trust is taken from time corresponding waves in the World Value 
Survey (WVS). An SWoD item is, however, included in the European Social Survey (ESS) as well reading: On the 
whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? In contrast to the CSES questionnaire (where 
the response options are 1 - not at all satisfied to 4 - very satisfied), the ESS response options are based on an 11 point 
scale, stretching from 0 (extremely dissatisfied to 10 (extremely satisfied) (for more information, see: 
www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data). The CSES and the ESS survey items are highly correlated in our sample of 34 
countries (r =.81), which make them not identical but at least very close. When also incorporating countries from the 
ESS in our dataset, the number of cases increases to 42. The outcome from such a maneuver is that all of our relation-
ships become even stronger. For example, the bivariate relationship between confidence in Political Parties and SWoD 
is (b=1.87 and R
2
=.54) with ESS data included compared to (b=.97 and R
2
=.31) without ESS data. The bivariate rela-
tionship between confidence in the Justice System and SWoD is (b=1.06 and R
2
=.51) with ESS data included compared 
to (b=.48 and R
2
=.26) without ESS data. However, the fact that all our results are strengthened when ESS data is in-
cluded is not very surprising since ESS only are adding European countries, where both trust in different institutions as 
well as SWoD in general are higher compared to countries outside Europe. Including EES data in our study would in 
relative terms "over-represent" Europe (let be that the sample is not representative as such in terms of countries includ-
ed). Not including ESS (or Eurobarometer) data gives our hypothesis more of an uphill battle. 
11
The sudden loss of significance and change of direction in the effect is often an indication of multicollinerarity, which 
here also is indicated by the low tolerance value for the Judicial Trust Index in model 4 (1/VIF= .23).  
12
 The very strong relationship between our two trust indices makes it possible to combine them and theoretically talk of 
trust in four central “procedural” electoral-judicial institutions – in Parliament and Political Parties (free and fair elections) 
as well as in  Judicial System and Police (rule of law). For this reason we have also elaborated with an interaction term 
between the two indices but due to multicollinearity, the model did not perform well.   
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Notwithstanding the limitation of not being able to really separate the impact of trust in democratic 
input institutions from the impact of trust in legal institution. Our conclusion is that countries 
where citizens tend to appreciate how democracy functions also are countries where people tend to 
trust societal institutions, especially democratic input and judicial institutions, and where we find 
more impartial public administrations. Whether the country is more or somewhat less successful 
economically is of a lesser importance.   
 
A Micro Level Test – The Case of Sweden  
 
Obviously, in all kinds of scientific endeavors, it is important to test theories not only in one but in 
many different ways. Multiple tests are reassuring if they come to the same result. And cause for 
more tests and perhaps rethinking if they come to divergent outcomes. Consequently, it is an im-
portant advantage that we through our access to data from the SOM Institute´s annual Swedish 
surveys can test our model using micro level individual data.  
 
On the individual level and at least among Swedes, the SWoD variable tends to be positively corre-
lated with trust in all kinds of societal institutions; but to very different degrees. The results in Table 
3, based on the 2012 SOM survey, show the strongest correlations for some political institutions – 
Government, Parliament and Political Parties – and weakest relationships for institutions like Trade 
Unions, the Royal House, Primary Schools, the Swedish Church, Banks and the Daily Press. Two 
judicial institutions – Courts and Police – are ranked in the upper half among the twenty one insti-
tutions, but have only medium sized correlations. 
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TABLE 3, CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SATISFACTION WITH THE WORKING OF DEMOCRACY 
(SWOD) AND TRUST IN SOCIETAL INSTITUTIONS AMONG SWEDISH CITIZENS (PEARSON'S R). 
  Institution Correlations (r) 
1.  Government .52 
2.  Parliament .50 
3.  Political Parties .43 
4.  The Riksbank .38 
5.  EU Commission .35 
6.  Local Governments .35 
7.  Courts .34 
8.  EU Parliament .33 
9.  Universities .29 
10.  Police .28 
11.  Major Companies .28 
12.  Health Care .27 
13.  Radio/Television .25 
14.  Armed Forces .24 
15.  United Nations .23 
16.  Press .23 
17.  Banks .22 
18.  Swedish Church .21 
19.  Primary School .20 
20.  Royal House .20 
21.  Trade Unions .15 
Comment: The data come from an annual Swedish survey conducted in 2012 by the SOM Institute at the University of 
Gothenburg. The number of respondents is between 4 500 and 6 000.  
 
Disregarding institutions not included in both the aggregated macro analysis and in the micro indi-
vidual level Swedish analysis, the similarity of the outcomes is remarkable. The rank order correla-
tion between the results in Table 1 and 3 is .67 (Spearman´s Rho).  And most significantly, macro 
as well as micro, electoral and judicial institutions tend to have the strongest relationships with how 
people judge the working of democracy – or in the case of judicial institutions among Swedes, at 
least be placed in the upper half of the institutional ranking. 
 
The rather striking resemblance between our macro and micro results is still there when we move 
from bivariate relationships and rank orders to multivariate controls. In Table 4, Swedes´ satisfac-
tion with the way democracy works is regressed on two separate trust indices footed on confidence 
in democratic input institutions (Political Parties and Parliament) as well as in legal institutions 
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(Courts and Police), on a public service performance index based on how citizens´ evaluate the job 
performance of ten Swedish public authorities/public service areas, and on household income. 
 
TABLE 4, REGRESSING SATISFACTION WITH THE WORKING OF DEMOCRACY (SWOD) AMONG 
SWEDES ON TRUST IN ELECTORAL AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS, ON ASSESSMENTS OF PUBLIC 
SERVICE PERFORMANCE, AND ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME (OLS REGR. COEFF; STD. ERR. WITHIN 
PARENTHESES). 
 
  Bivariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
 
Electoral Trust Index 2.12*** (.06) - 1.48*** (.06) - 1.35*** (.07) 
     
 
Judicial Trust Index 1.40*** (.06) - - .95*** (.07) .39*** (.07) 
     
 
Public Service Performance Index 1.46*** (.08) 1.50*** (.08) .82*** (.08) .94*** (.09) .64*** (.08) 
     
 
Household Income .32*** (.04) .34*** (.04) .18*** (.03) .27*** (.04) .17*** (.03) 
     
 
Constant - 1.89*** (.05) 1.59*** (.05) 1.66*** (05) 1.52*** (.05) 
Adj. R-squared - .13 .29 .19 .30 
N: 2 831 2 831 2 831 2 831 2 831 
Comment: p>|t|=.001***; =.01**; =.05*. Individual level Swedish data from a SOM Institute survey in the fall of 
2010. The dependent variable (SWoD) is coded 1 (low satisfaction) to 4 (high satisfaction). All independent variables are scaled 
from 0 (low trust, low performance assessments, low income) to 1 (high trust, high performance assessments, high income). The 
trust indices combines trust in four electoral-judicial institutions - Political Parties and Parliament as well as Police and the 
Courts. The Public Service Performance index is based on how Swedes evaluate the job performance in ten public service areas 
(see Johansson and Holmberg 2011). Survey respondents provide the information behind the household income variable. Thanks 
to Per Hedberg for help with data runs on the SOM material.  
 
Given the number of respondents – about 3 000 – it is not surprising that all coefficients are highly 
significant. Thus, in this case it is the size of the coefficients that are of most interest.  And here we 
find an outcome we recognize from the previous macro analysis, although it is more evident on the 
micro level. Peoples´ trust in democratic input institutions as well as in legal institutions - and as-
sessment of the performance of the public sector (=quality of government) - are strongly related to 
how the working of Swedish democracy is evaluated; political trust stronger than performance as-
sessments. Trust in judicial institutions has the expected positive impact as well but not on the 
same level. The correlation between our two trust indices is medium high (+.51). The independent 
effect of trust in legal institutions get to be somewhat overshadowed by trust in the related trust in 
political institutions. The economic status of citizens is also connected to how the working of de-
mocracy is perceived, but clearly on a much lower level.  
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The conclusion is the same as before when we analyzed aggregated national results. Overall satis-
faction with how Swedish democracy works tend to be most pronounced among people who trust 
central electoral and judicial institutions and who perceive that the job performance of Swedish 
public authorities is good. And here the direct effect of institutional trust is stronger than the direct 
effect of the job performance assessments of how public bureaucracies work. Whether people are 
rich or poor matter less.   
 
Causal Direction 
 
Our model is based on the simplified notion that institutional trust “causes” regime support, not 
the other way around. And that is of course a oversimplification. In reality we must assume that 
trust impacts support at the same time as support impacts trust. We have a circular process with 
feedback loops. 
 
 One way to highlight that peoples´ SWoD are influenced by institutional trust at an earlier time (t-1) 
and that citizens´ trust levels as well are impacted by how they previously evaluated the working of 
their democracy (t-1) is to apply a dynamic model on panel data. We have preliminary done that 
using Swedish data from a Citizen Panel put together at the Department of Political Science in 
Gothenburg (Oscarsson, Dahlberg and Martinsson  2013). The outcome is very instructive. The 
effects both ways turn out to be substantial and statistically significant. Institutional trust at t-1 has 
an effect on SWoD at time-point t, and SWoD at t-1 has an effect on institutional trust at time-point 
t. There is an effect circle. But in that feedback loop it looks as if the more specific attitude, i.e. 
institutional trust, has a somewhat larger impact on the more general attitude SWoD.13 At least that 
                                                     
13
 In situations with reversed causality in cross-section data, the effects in terms of absolute levels could be overstated 
since the relationships may suffer from endogeneity. In order to sort out such a problem panel data is needed. In the 
Swedish Citizen Panel (Oscarsson, Dahlberg and Martinsson 2013) hosted by the Laboratory of Opinion Research 
(LORe) at the University of Gothenburg, approximately 15 000 Swedish citizens are surveyed on a regular basis, usual-
ly every sixth month starting back in late 2010 (for more information, see. www.lore.gu.se/surveys/citizen). The Citizen 
Panel consists of, amongst others, a standing block of survey questions where SWoD and trust in Parliament are in-
cluded. In total, the survey contains seven waves which imply that we have the opportunity to run auto-regressive mod-
els on SWoD and institutional trust. In this respect we specify a simple LDV model such as: ∆Yi = α+(γ-1)Yi,t-1 + β Xi,t-1 + 
et. Starting with the effect of trust in Parliament at t-1 on SWoD at t, under control for the effect of SWoD at t-1, the main 
effect is (b=.27*** R
2
=.21) while the effect of SWoD at t-1 on trust in Parliament at time-point t, under control for the 
effect of trust in Parliament at t-1, is b=.22*** R
2
=.18. The results become, on the marginal, even more pronounced when 
longer lags are used. These outcomes suggest that the relationship is dynamic and that causes are going in both direc-
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is the result in our analysis using SWoD and trust in parliament as the operational measures. How-
ever, it is important to emphasis that the effects go both ways. Consequently, our model specifying 
an impact of institutional trust on regime support is relevant. Granted though, that the estimated 
effects of institutional trust are going to be on the high end since we have not controlled away the 
reversed effects of SWoD on institutional trust. 
 
 Institutional Trust Matters  
 
Our main results can be simply stated. There is truth in the saying that trust builds and sustains 
societies. In our study, based on macro as well as micro level data, we have shown that institutional 
trust has an independent effect on regime support. And the kind of institutional trust that is most 
important is trust in political/democratic input institutions and in judicial institutions. Trust in oth-
er societal institutions like economic institutions, media institutions, religious institutions, civil soci-
ety institutions, and public service institutions matter less.14  
 
The conclusions, however, are not stand alone facts, independent of our theoretical model. On the 
contrary, the results are to a degree contingent on the model and the controls applied. In our case 
we have squared a complex reality by specifying a model with only three/four explanatory factors. 
And we have not specified nor tested any indirect effects between our explanatory variables.  Fur-
thermore, the model presupposes a uni-directional causal mechanism that we for sure know is a 
simplification. Peoples´ evaluations of how their democracy works influence the degree to which 
they trust vital societal institutions at the same time as trust in central institutions impacts how citi-
zens assess the working of their democracy.  We can talk of feedback loops and vicious or virtues 
circles (Norris 2000). However, our tests have mainly been stationary at one point in time, not dy-
namic over time as they ideally should have been. 
 
We like to conclude with two easy to grasp and very visual graphical models – one on the individual 
micro level and one on the macro level. Both models include our three explanatory factors as well 
                                                                                                                                                           
tions. There is, however, a slightly stronger impact from trust in Parliament on SWoD than the other way around, which 
is supporting the theoretical approach of the current paper. 
14
 With the reservation that our test of the effect of trust in public administration is questionable since it is only based on 
macro data aggregated from WVS-measurements of trust in Civil Services. And those measurements  we believe may 
not accurately measure trust in public administration. Our micro level tests using data from the Swedish SOM Institute 
did not include any measure of trust in public administration.    
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as the dependent variable regime support measured as satisfaction with the way democracy works. 
In the models, we have estimated not only direct effects on SWoD but also a potential indirect 
effect of quality of government through institutional trust on SWoD (see Figure 2). The measure of 
institutional trust is operationalized as our index covering democratic electoral input institutions.   
 
FIGURE 2, ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF TRUST IN ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS, OF QUALITY OF 
GOVERNMENT AND OF ECONOMIC WEALTH ON CITIZENS' SATISFACTION WITH THE WORKING 
OF DEMOCRACY IN THEIR COUNTRIES: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS. 
Structural Equation Model: National Level Data/ 34 Countries. 
 
 
 
Structural Equation Model: Individual Level Data/ Swedish Citizens. 
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Comment: For details about variables and codings, see table 2 and 4, respectively. N:34 (National level); N:2 831 (Individ-
ual level). Maximum Likelihood Estimation. p>|t|=.001***; =.01**; =.05*. 
 
The results of the macro and micro tests are as before the same. Trust in democratic electoral input  
institutions as well as quality of government, measured as quality and impartiality of public admin-
istration, have independent direct effects on how citizens evaluate how their democracy functions; 
electoral trust somewhat more than quality of government. However, quality of government also 
has an indirect effect on regime support. That indirect effect goes via institutional trust. Quality of 
government influences institutional trust which in turn impacts regime support.  
 
When it comes to regime support (and regime legitimacy) institutional trust matters; especially trust 
in electoral and judicial institutions. And quality of government matters. Economic factors, howev-
er, matter less in this instance. Political factors rule, not economical. The economists Daron Ace-
moglu and James Robinson repeatedly stress the importance of political institutions in their book 
Why Nations Fail (2012). Our results render further support to their conclusions. But we are more 
specific. Nations succeed when there is trust in electoral and judicial institutions and when there are 
impartial public administrations. 
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